JURY IRREGULARITY

JURY IRREGULARITY

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL

AGAINST CONVICTION

IN THE MATTER OF:

REX

V

CAERWYN ASH

 

 

GROUNDS OF APPEAL AGAINST CONVICTION

Appellant: Caerwyn Ash
Case Number: 62HA021214019

Appellant Number: 202302998 B3 NB
Court of Trial: Cardiff Crown Court

Judge: HHJ Neville Wayne Beard
Date of Conviction: 25th May 2023

 

 

NOTICE AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL

 

SUMMARY OF THE APPLICATION

The Appellant appeals against conviction on the basis that the safety of the verdict is undermined by a serious irregularity in the composition and impartiality of the jury, namely that the jury foreman was personally known to the Appellant and had professional connections with prosecution witnesses.

 

It is submitted that, applying the test in [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67], a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.

 

The sole issue is whether the conviction is unsafe due to apparent bias and material non-disclosure concerning the jury foreman.

 

It is submitted that the presence and conduct of the foreman fatally undermined the fairness of the trial.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • THE APPELLANT

The Appellant is a 44-year-old man of previous good character with no prior convictions or criminal history of any kind. This matter represents his first arrest and first involvement with the criminal justice system. The allegation of revenge pornography was subsequently shown to have been fabricated by a former partner acting maliciously and vindictively.

 

The Appellant is highly educated, having attained qualifications to PhD level, and has throughout his adult life conducted himself as a productive and responsible member of society. In addition to his professional and academic achievements, he has undertaken charitable and community-focused work, demonstrating a longstanding commitment to public service and the welfare of others.

 

There is no evidence before the Court suggesting any propensity toward criminality, harassment, or exploitative conduct. To the contrary, the Appellant’s character, background, and personal history are wholly inconsistent with the allegations that were advanced against him.

 

The appellant has consistently and strenuously denied any wrongdoing and has consistently vehemently denied the allegations, describing them as unverified and provably untrue.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • THE TRIAL

The self-representing defendant was partially acquitted following a contested criminal trial in which significant issues were raised regarding disclosure and the conduct of the investigation.

 

The defendant, acting in person throughout proceedings, repeatedly sought disclosure of evidential material through multiple legal and procedural pathways, including formal defence requests and applications concerning unused material. Those requests were allegedly denied or inadequately addressed during the course of the proceedings.

 

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned mixed verdicts. The defendant was acquitted on Counts 6 and 7 and found not guilty on additional charges including Counts 3, 8, and 9. Guilty verdicts were returned on five remaining charges.

 

During the proceedings, the defence argued that the prosecution had failed to comply fully with its disclosure obligations and that potentially exculpatory material had not been made available in a timely manner. The defendant further alleged inconsistencies within witness evidence and official documentation connected to the investigation.

 

The case drew attention due to the defendant’s extensive independent legal preparation despite having no formal legal representation and no communication within prison. Observers noted the unusual nature of a litigant in person conducting detailed cross-examination, disclosure arguments, and legal submissions ordinarily undertaken by qualified counsel.

 

The defendant maintains that the acquittals on several counts demonstrate serious weaknesses in parts of the prosecution case and has continued pursuing complaints and post-trial legal remedies relating to disclosure and investigatory conduct.

 

Indictment

Law

Verdict

Sentence

Count 1

S1(1) Protection of Children Act (1978)

Guilty

1 year

Count 2

S1(1) Protection of Children Act (1978)

Guilty

1 year

Count 3

S62(1) Coroners and Justice Act 2009

Not Guilty

 

Count 4

S63(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)

Guilty

1 year

Count 5

S63(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)

Guilty

1 year

Count 6

S1(1) Protection of Children Act (1978)

Acquitted

 

Count 7

S1(1) Protection of Children Act (1978)

Acquitted

 

Count 8

S63(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)

Not Guilty

 

Count 9

S63(1) Criminal Justice and Immigration Act (2008)

Not Guilty

 

Count 10

Perverting the Course of Justice

Guilty

2 Years

Table 1: Indictment, Legislation and Verdict

 

 

 

 

 

 

Day

Date

 

 

Monday

15th May 2023

Jury Selection

Spoke to CPS Prosecutor about James Prosser on jury

 

 

 

 

Tuesday

16th May 2023

PC Rhys Williams (SWP 5963)

 

 

 

PC Scott Anderson (SWP 5388)

 

Wednesday

17th May 2023

Kelly Hurley (SWP

 

 

 

Martin Richards (SWP 57076)

 

Thursday

18th May 2023

Lyndsay Howe (SWP

 

 

 

Christopher Evans (SWP

 

Friday

19th May 2023

Jonathan Howe (SWP 5416)

 

 

 

 

 

Monday

22nd May 2023

Newton Meeting

Non-Defendant Bad Character

 

 

Scott Anderson (SWP 5388)

No Case to Answer

Tuesday

23th May 2023

Caerwyn Ash

 

 

 

 

 

Wednesday

24th May 2023

Trevor James

 

 

 

 

 

Thursday

25th May 2023

Deliberation & Verdict

 

 

 

 

 

Friday

26th May 2023

Deliberation & Verdict

 

Table 2: Trial Overview

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • FACTS OF THE TRIAL

The Appellant was convicted on 25th May 2023 at Cardiff Crown Court.

The jury foreman:

  • Was a serving police officer;
  • Was personally known to the Appellant prior to trial;
  • Knew, or had professional dealings with, prosecution witnesses (also police officers).
  • These matters were not disclosed during jury selection.
  • The juror was subsequently elected foreman and participated fully in deliberations.

 

The trial judge failed to give proper consideration to the defendant’s extensive Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (C-PTSD) as a significant mitigating factor. Despite evidence of the condition and its impact on the defendant’s mental state, behaviour, and decision-making, the judge did not adequately weigh its relevance during sentencing, resulting in insufficient consideration of circumstances that may have reduced the defendant’s culpability. The evidence demonstrated a longstanding and significant mental health condition with potential relevance to culpability and sentencing, yet the judgment did not reflect appropriate weight being given to this mitigating evidence.

 

Multiple witnesses (or a witness on multiple occasions) knowingly gave false testimony under oath about material facts. These false statements misrepresented key evidence, distorted the factual record presented to the jury, and had the potential to influence the jury’s assessment of credibility, guilt, or innocence. By misleading the jury on significant issues, the perjured testimony undermined the fairness and integrity of the trial and may have affected the verdict.

 

South Wales Police Officer Jonathan Howe relied upon contemporaneous interview notes that had not been agreed, adopted, or signed by the defendant. The presentation of these unverified notes to the jury gave a misleading impression of accuracy and reliability, potentially influencing the jury’s assessment of the evidence.

 

 

 

 

  • THE JUROR

The juror was known to the defendant, as both attended Llanishen High School.

During their time at Llanishen High School, the juror and his brother bullied the defendant.

The juror was employed as a police officer with South Wales Police.

The juror came from a family with extensive connections to law enforcement, with multiple family members serving in the police force.

The juror’s mother was one of the highest-ranking female officers within South Wales Police.

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • APPEAL PROCEEDINGS

The Appellant was unable to communicate with Sophie Carter-Ingram from the date of arrest on 20 September 2022 until the commencement of the trial.

During the trial, the trial judge stated that Sophie Carter-Ingram was not permitted to address the court and was not allowed to bring documents into the courtroom.

The Appellant was convicted at Cardiff Crown Court on 25 May 2023.

While detained at HMP Parc, the Appellant’s legal correspondence was withheld and not sent or delivered until after conviction.

The Appellant was disciplined by HMP Parc for attempting to contact Sophie Carter-Ingram.

The Appellant was thereby deprived of contact with Sophie Carter-Ingram, who acted as a McKenzie Friend during the proceedings. The Appellant was further punished for attempting to communicate with her. Following what the Appellant contends was a deliberate breach of his human rights by state authorities, he attempted to take his own life.

The Appellant was transferred to HMP Usk the following day.

Within days of arriving at HMP Usk, the Appellant was able to re-establish contact with Sophie Carter-Ingram.

Sophie Carter-Ingram subsequently provided the email evidence that had been requested during the trial through a number of lawful channels.

Within 24 hours of receiving this material, HMP Usk confiscated the newly obtained evidence together with other legal documents belonging to the Appellant.

On 26 September 2023, Sophie Carter-Ingram submitted the appeal documents by email.

On 7 February 2024, Mr Justice Turner refused both leave to appeal and an extension of time.

On 20 March 2024, an application was submitted seeking the prosecution of an individual for perjury.

On 20 March 2024, the Appellant was recalled to prison.

The Appellant contends that a conflict of interest existed involving Governor Heidi Murray.

On [X] August 2024, the Appellant submitted a renewal application. (Insert the correct date and details of the application.)

HMP Usk refused to provide the Appellant with basic legal materials, including pen and paper, which were required for the preparation of legal documents.

HMP Usk also refused to approve legal telephone numbers, thereby preventing the Appellant from making legal calls and communicating effectively in relation to ongoing legal proceedings.

Full appeal hearing on 19th February 2025

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  • THE LAW

A juror failed to disclose a relationship or conflict of interest involving the defendant, a witness, or the prosecution, the issue is treated as a matter of juror bias and the defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the [Human Rights Act (1998)] and [European Convention on Human Rights] (the right to an independent and impartial tribunal).

The governing principles come from:

  • [The Juries Act 1974]
  • [Human Rights Act (1998), Article 6]
  • Common law rules on jury impartiality, and court decisions on “apparent bias” and juror misconduct.
  • [The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015] strengthened rules against juror misconduct and improper conduct affecting impartiality.

 

During jury selection, Jurors must disclose connections that could affect impartiality jurors are expected to reveal anything that may create bias or the appearance of bias, such as:

  • knowing the defendant,
  • knowing prosecution witnesses,
  • personal involvement in similar events,
  • family or financial connections,

 

A juror may be challenged “for cause” if they are connected to one side or appear unable to be impartial. The CPS guidance specifically states that a juror can be challenged where they are “connected to one side in some way.”

 

Applying the test from the case of [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67], a fair-minded and informed observer conclude that there was a real possibility of bias where James Prosser a Detective in South Wales Police

 

On the first day of trial this was raised with the CPS prosecutor James Mason Wilson who replied in the presence of Sophie Carter Ingram “it’s too late to do anything about this” and walked away.

 

On the X may a No Case to answer submission was given to the court clerk (Luke) who photocopied the pages and gave to CPS Prosecutor James Mason Wilson and the Judge.

The conflict was disclosed to the court twice before the verdict. The judge has a residual discretion to remove jurors where fairness is threatened, discharge the entire jury, or declares a mistrial.

 

The defendant informed the Court of Appeal by letter [pages x] on the x 2023, describing the nature of the relationship, with the juror and reasons why the juror deliberately concealed it.

The administration of justice was deliberately prejudiced the trial process and undermine the principles of justice and public confidence in the verdict is damaged.

 

The juror intentionally hid the conflict; it amounted to contempt of court, juror misconduct, or a criminal offence.

  • GROUNDS OF APPEAL

GROUND 1: JUROR BIAS AND APPARENT PARTIALITY

  1. The jury foreman was a serving police officer.
  2. The foreman was personally known to the Appellant prior to the trial.
  3. The foreman also knew, or had professional dealings with, one or more of the prosecution witnesses, who were themselves police officers.

This gives rise to a clear appearance of bias. The test is whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the jury was biased. In this case, that test is plainly met.

 

In [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67], the House of Lords established that apparent bias arises where a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude there is a real possibility of bias.

 

Further, in [R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37], the House of Lords held that the presence of a serving police officer on a jury in a case involving police evidence may give rise to apparent bias depending on the circumstances.

 

The present case goes further than [R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37]

  • The juror was not merely a police officer;
  • He had actual connections with prosecution witnesses;
  • He was elected foreman, increasing his influence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GROUND 2: FAILURE TO DISCLOSE MATERIAL CONNECTIONS

  1. The foreman failed to disclose his prior acquaintance with the Appellant.
  2. The foreman failed to disclose his professional relationship with prosecution witnesses.
  3. These matters were material and should have been disclosed during jury selection (voir dire).

The non-disclosure deprived the defence of the opportunity to challenge the juror and seek his exclusion.

 

The foreman failed to disclose:

  • His prior acquaintance with the Appellant;
  • His professional relationship with prosecution witnesses.

In [R v McNeill [2009] EWCA Crim 3188], the Court of Appeal emphasised that non-disclosure by a juror of material information may render a conviction unsafe where it gives rise to the possibility of bias.

Similarly, in [R v Smith (Lance Percy) [2005] UKHL 73], the House of Lords confirmed that jury irregularities must be assessed by considering whether they give rise to a real possibility of bias affecting the verdict.

The failure to disclose in the present case deprived the defence of the opportunity to challenge the juror, constituting a serious procedural irregularity.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GROUND 3: BREACH OF THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL

The Appellant’s right to a fair trial, including trial by an independent and impartial tribunal, was compromised.

Given that:

  • The foreman holds a position of influence within jury deliberations;
  • He had connections to both the Appellant and prosecution witnesses;

there is a real risk that:

  • He may have influenced the jury’s deliberations;
  • The jury may have given undue weight to his views due to his status as a police officer.

 

The Appellant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights has been violated.

 

In [Pullar v United Kingdom], the European Court of Human Rights held that even the appearance of bias may be sufficient to breach Article 6.

 

Further, in [R v Gough [1993] UKHL 1] (as refined by [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67]), the court emphasised that justice must not only be done but must be seen to be done.

Given:

  • The foreman’s role as a police officer;
  • His connections to prosecution witnesses;
  • His position of influence in deliberations;

There is a real risk that the jury’s verdict was affected, or is perceived to have been affected.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

GROUND 4: UNSAFE CONVICTION

In light of the above, the conviction is unsafe because:

  • The integrity of the jury process was compromised;
  • There is a real possibility of bias affecting the verdict;
  • Public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined if the conviction were allowed to stand.

 

Pursuant to section 2 of the [Criminal Appeal Act 1968], the conviction must be quashed if it is unsafe.

In [R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66], the House of Lords confirmed that the ultimate question for the Court of Appeal is whether the conviction is safe.

In the present case:

  • The integrity of the jury has been compromised;
  • There is at least a real possibility of bias;
  • Public confidence in the verdict is undermined.

Accordingly, the conviction is unsafe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

8.0 ISSUES

The issues for the Court are:

  1. Whether the circumstances give rise to apparent bias;
  1. Whether the failure to disclose material connections rendered the trial unfair;
  2. Whether the conviction is unsafe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9.0 LEGAL FRAMEWORK

(1) Apparent Bias

  1. The applicable test is set out in [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67]:
    Whether the fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.
  2. The principle that justice must be seen to be done was emphasised in [R v Gough [1993] (as refined by [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67]).

 

(2) Jurors with Police Connections

  1. In [R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37], the House of Lords held that the presence of a serving police officer on a jury may give rise to apparent bias depending on the circumstances.
  2. The present case is stronger than [R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37] because:
  • The juror had direct connections to prosecution witnesses;
  • The juror knew the Appellant personally;
  • The juror acted as foreman.

 

(3) Non-Disclosure by Jurors

  1. In [R v McNeill [2009] EWCA Crim 3188], the Court of Appeal held that non-disclosure of material information by a juror may render a conviction unsafe.
  2. In [R v Smith (Lance Percy) [2005] UKHL 73] (Lance Percy), the House of Lords confirmed that the key question is whether the irregularity gives rise to a real possibility of bias.

 

(4) Right to a Fair Trial

  1. Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights guarantees a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.
  2. In [Pullar v United Kingdom], the court held that even the appearance of bias may breach Article 6.

 

(5) Unsafe Conviction

  1. Under section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the Court must allow the appeal if the conviction is unsafe.
  2. In R v Pendleton, the House of Lords confirmed that the ultimate question is whether the conviction is safe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

10.0 SUBMISSIONS

(1) Apparent Bias is Clearly Established

  1. A fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias because:
  • The foreman was a serving police officer;
  • He knew prosecution witnesses;
  • He knew the Appellant.
  1. This goes beyond mere professional background and amounts to a direct conflict of interest.

 

(2) The Position of Foreman Aggravates the Risk

  1. The foreman plays a central role in:
  • Leading deliberations;
  • Structuring discussion;
  • Delivering the verdict.
  1. His status as a police officer would likely carry weight with other jurors, creating a real risk of undue influence.

 

(3) Material Non-Disclosure Undermined the Process

  1. The juror failed to disclose:
  • His prior acquaintance with the Appellant;
  • His professional relationship with prosecution witnesses.
  1. This deprived the defence of the opportunity to challenge the juror.
  2. Such non-disclosure is a serious irregularity within the principles identified in [R v McNeill [2009] EWCA Crim 3188].

 

(4) The Conviction is Unsafe

  1. The combination of:
  • Apparent bias;
  • Undisclosed conflicts;
  • The juror’s influential role;

renders the conviction unsafe.

  1. Public confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined if such a conviction were allowed to stand.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

11.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The presence of a jury foreman who was both known to the Appellant and professionally connected to prosecution witnesses represents a fundamental irregularity. The resulting appearance of bias renders the conviction unsafe.

 

This case involves more than a technical irregularity. It strikes at the heart of the jury system.

A jury foreman who:

  • Is a serving police officer;
  • Knows the defendant;
  • Knows the prosecution witnesses, creates an overwhelming appearance of bias.

Applying the principles in [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67] and [R v Abdroikof [2007] UKHL 37], the conviction cannot be regarded as safe.

Applying [Porter v Magill (2001) UKHL 67], there is plainly a real possibility that the jury was biased.

The conviction is therefore unsafe.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The juror personally knows a prosecution witness from work, does not tell the court, and later helps convict the defendant.

 

The defence could argue, the juror should have been removed for cause, the jury was not impartial, and the conviction is unsafe because an informed observer would see a real possibility of bias.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

12.0 RELIEF SOUGHT

  1. The Appellant respectfully invites the Court to:
  2. Allow the appeal;
  3. Quash the conviction;
  4. Order a retrial if appropriate.

 

 

 

 

 

materially mistaken factual basis

 

undisclosed relationship fundamentally undermined the

 

not been disclosed was a “serious irregularity”

 

founded on a materially mistaken factual basis

fundamentally undermined